This paper examines the interaction between propensity to corrupt (PTC) and firm performance. First, using unique data on Moscow traffic violations, I build an individual measure of PTC for every Muscovite with a driver license (3.1 million people). Next, I show that corrupt entrepreneurs outperform non-corrupt ones. A one standard deviation increase in PTC of firms' management corresponds to an increase in the annual revenue growth rate by 1.9%. Finally, I construct the measure of PTC for different regulatory authorities. I find that corruption propensity of government employees is negatively related to business development.
Introduction
On February 10, 2010 IKEA fired two top executives at its Russian subsidiary. IKEA spokeswoman Camilla Meiby stated that these persons were fired "in connection with a contractor-company that was trying to resolve the situation with the power supply at the Mega shopping center in St. Petersburg…We know there have been bribes…We've seen the documents."
1 Is it optimal to fire managers for bribery? Do corrupt managers deliver superior firm performance? If a firm operates in poor institutional environment, would it be better off to face less corrupt tax inspector or more corrupt one? 2 In this paper I investigate these questions using micro-level data on traffic violations in Moscow.
The key idea of the paper is to infer individual propensity to corrupt (PTC) from the data of recorded traffic violations. Drivers commit traffic violations from time to time. However, in corrupt countries not all traffic violations are recorded. If one is being stopped by police, then it is often possible to avoid a formal penalty in exchange for a bribe. Therefore, observing a person's statistics on recorded traffic violations for a long period of time allows to make the inference about the person's propensity to corrupt. To better understand my approach to measure PTC, consider the following example. Two persons, A and B, have identical demographic characteristics, income level, and driving style. However, for some reason, A has much higher number of recorded traffic violations than B has. One possible explanation is that A is just very unlucky, and every time he or she was speeding he was caught by police. Another possible explanation is that A and B in fact were stopped for traffic violations about the same number of times. However, B paid bribes to the police more often than A did. Therefore B has lower number of recorded traffic violations.
Russia provides a very unique environment to study corruption-related issues. Russia is the 6 th largest economy in the world with GDP per capita equal to $19,840. Another important aspect which makes Russia an interesting case to study is the data availability. Russia inherited from Soviet Union a very comprehensive system of government statistics. Different administrative agencies routinely collect large amounts of data at individual and firm level. My data cover the entire population of Moscow and all firms ranging from very small ones to really big ones. Thus I can provide a comprehensive analysis of the economy with size of a typical European country like Austria, Denmark, Greece, or Norway. It is hard to 1 See e.g. the Russian Monitor(2010) for the story. 2 As Huntington(1968) wrote in his famous book, "the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized and honest bureaucracy".
3 Source: WorldBank 2010 data imagine that such detailed data will become available for the U.S. or any Western economy in the near future. There are few recent studies which build on this comparative advantage of the Russian statistical system. 4 This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, I develop an individual measure of propensity to corrupt for 3.1 million Muscovites. Second, I show that PTC of firms' management is positively related to firm performance. Finally, I build the measure of PTC for different regulatory authorities. I find that corruption of tax collecting agencies and fire safety departments is negatively related to firms' performance. This paper is closely related to the fast growing literature on managerial malfeasance such as Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) ,
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) , Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) , Mironov (2012) , Braguinsky and Mityakov (2012) , and many others.
First, I build a measure of individual PTC based on the discrepancies between data on traffic violations and traffic accidents. The datasets cover the city of Moscow and the region of Moscow for the period from 1997 to 2007. The data contain information on 6,784,971 traffic violations and 159,054 traffic accidents. The key difference between these two datasets that almost all traffic accidents are recorded, whereas the decision of whether to record a traffic violation or not is determined by a policeman. The policeman and the violator often can mutually agree not to apply a formal punishment in exchange for a bribe. I estimate the expected number of recorded traffic violations for each driver using as explanatory variables the demographic characteristics of the driver, personal income, driving distance to work, the number of traffic accidents in which he or she participated, and his/her car characteristics. Next, I build an individual PTC measure as a difference between the predicted number of traffic violations and the actual number of traffic violations. The economic intuition under this measure is as follows. The lower is the number of recorded traffic violations given the driver's observable characteristics, the higher is the probability that some of the traffic violations were not recorded in exchange for a bribe. Using this approach, I build the measure of PTC for 3,136,839
Muscovites.
Second, I analyze the relation between PTC of firms' management and firm performance. I build a measure of management PTC as the average of individual PTC among the company's five best paid employees. I find that the firms with corrupt management grow faster than the ones with not-corrupt management. A one standard deviation increase in PTC of companies' management corresponds to an increase in the annual revenue growth rate by 1.9%. This empirical finding suggests a possible explanation why some empirical studies might find a positive link between corruption and economic development (e.g. Egger and Winner, 2006 Exclusion of the companies which own cars allows to exclude CEOS with chauffeurs from the sample. I show that the main results hold on the subsample of companies without cars.
Specifically, the revenue growth and PTC of firms' management are positively related.
Finally, I study the relation between corruption of different regulatory authorities and firms'
performance. According to NISSE (2010) This paper is also related to the literature on implication of corruption to economic development. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) present the analytical framework which might explain why "in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development." Shleifer and Vishny (1994) analyze the economic effect of privatization and commercialization in the presence of corruption. Mauro (1995) provides evidence that corruption negatively impacts growth based on the sample of 68 countries. Shleifer and Wei (2000) find negative relation of corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI). Kauffman and Wei (1999) show that "firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital."
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I provides an analytical framework. Section II describes the data. Section III discusses the empirical strategy. Section IV presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes the paper. I introduce this simple model to illustrate that propensity of the driver to offer a bribe can be inferred from the number of recorded traffic violations. The higher is the number of recorded traffic violations given the number of traffic accidents, the lower is the corruptness of the driver.
Certainly, the precision of this measure depends on the time length. The higher is the number of time periods during each driver is observed, the higher is the precision of this corruptness measure.
I.B Corruption and Firm Performance
How does corruption affect economic development? The theoretical literature does not provide a univocal answer to this question. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that corruption leads to a misallocation of talents which is very costly for economy. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that when the entry of government agencies into regulation activity is free, corruption drives private agents out of the market. Guriev (2004) shows that corruption "still results in excessive red tape, even after the bureaucrat reduces red tape in exchange for bribes".
However, it has occasionally been acknowledged that not all forms of corruption are the same, and that some corruption might actually be beneficial for economic development. For example, Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) suggest that under rigid regulation and inefficient bureaucracy, corruption might foster economic growth. In their model, agents use "speed money" to get around bad laws and institutions. Additionally, Lui (1985) shows that bribery can be efficient in a queuing model if agents with higher values of time can use bribes to obtain a better place in line. In this paper I test the latter hypothesis. 
II.B Sample of Companies
The companies' financial data are obtained from Rosstat, an official Russian statistical Using the personal income data of Moscow residents, I select all firms which have at least 10 employees. Next, I match this sample of firms to Rosstat data and include the companies which have reported revenue greater than $100,000. I impose these restrictions to avoid inclusion of tiny firms which might not report their financial data accurately. 
II.C Sample of Regulatory Agencies
According to the NISSE (2010) The majority of regulatory authorities operate either at federal, or at regional, or at municipal level. Therefore, they are the same for all Moscow firms. However, there are some supervisory agencies which operate at the district level -fire safety authority, sanitary inspection authority, police, and tax agencies.
The city of Moscow is divided into 10 administrative districts. Using the personal income data of Moscow residents, I obtain employment data for local fire departments and sanitary inspection departments. (5)- (6) of Table   AIII , Panel A and B).
Each administrative district in Moscow is further divided between several tax agencies. The largest (Central) district has 10 different local tax agencies, and the smallest (Zelenograd) district has only one tax agency. Other districts of Moscow have 3 local tax agencies each. I obtain the employment data for every local tax agency using the personal income database. Unfortunately, the structure of police departments in Russia is not transparent. Therefore the police employment data cannot be obtained at the district level using available data.
III Empirical Strategy
First, I build a measure of propensity to corrupt (PTC) based on the comparison of traffic violations and traffic accidents data. The key idea behind this measure is that not all actual traffic violations are recorded. Levin and Satarav (2000) describe the survey results which show that Russian police is a highly corrupt entity. It is almost always possible to avoid a formal punishment for traffic violation in exchange for a bribe. The recording of traffic accidents is different. Russian law requires that all traffic accidents should be reported to the police. De facto it means that the parties involved in the traffic accident cannot resolve the issue in an amicable way without informing the police. If one party leaves the place of an accident then another party can always inform the police that the first party ran away. Then the first party will be considered guilty of the accident automatically. Therefore, even if the parties could reach an agreement who was guilty of the accident, they should wait for police officers to record this fact. Hence, in contrast to traffic violations, almost all traffic accidents are recorded in the police database. To build an individual corruption attitude measure, I estimate the following regression:
where d is the driver index, Intuitively, the lower is the number of recorded traffic violations given the number of observed traffic accidents and other controls, the higher is the probability that the traffic violations were not recorded in exchange for a bribe.
Second, I construct the PTC measure of firms' management. Since the personal income data do not reveal the job titles, I select 5 best paid employees in every firm. It is likely that CEOs, deputy CEOs, CFOs, chief accounts are among the best paid employees in every company. Then I calculate the average of individual PTC measures among the best paid employees which have a driver license:
where f is the firm index, i is the employee index (employees are sorted based on the annual
PTC is the propensity to corrupt of employee i which works at firm f, and
is the indicator function which equates to one if employee i belongs to a set of drivers (i.e. has a driver license). If an employee does not have a driver license, his/her PTC cannot be evaluated using the described methodology. Therefore, I exclude those employees from calculation of the firms' PTC. For robustness checks, I construct PTC for one best paid employee, top 10% best paid employees, and top 25% best paid employees.
Third, I test Hypothesis 1 by estimating the following regression:
where t is the time index, and f is the firm index. 
where t, f, f t Controls , t  , and f t  are the same as in equation (3) 
where t, f, f t Controls , t  , and f t  are the same as in equation (3). Hypothesis 1 implies that 0 f   because the higher is the number of recorded traffic violations, the lower is probability that firm's employees avoided formal punishment in exchange for a bribe. However, if the traffic violations are recorded fairly, then the constructed measures of corruption capture the safeness of driving, not propensity to corrupt. Thus, it is possible that some other personal characteristics (e.g. risk attitude) are correlated with number of traffic violations. Less dangerous drivers have fewer number of traffic violations not because of paying bribes to policemen.
Hence, the obtained empirical results might be driven by other unobservable characteristics related to driving safeness. To test this alternative explanation, I estimate the following regression:
where t, f, 
where tax is the tax agency index, tax N is the number of tax agency employees, i is the employee index (employees are sorted based on the annual pay), 
IV Empirical Results

IV.A The Measure of Corruption
I estimate equation (1) to build the individual PTC measures. Driver-level controls include gender, age, driving experience, distance to work, logarithm of income, dummy whether a driver is from the city of Moscow, dummy whether a driver owns a car, car horse power, and car production year. Formal punishment requires to spend some time in bank to pay a fine and after that to come to a local police office to return the driving license retained by the police. Thus, people with high value of time might prefer to resolve problems informally. Columns (2)-(5) contain estimations of equation (1) for different subsamples. Column (2) includes only drivers from the city of Moscow. Column (3) presents the subsample of driver for which distance to work is determined.
Column (4) contains only drivers from Moscow which own a car. Column (5) includes only drivers with a positive record of traffic accidents.
[Insert Table I here]
Next, applying formula (2) I calculate PTC for firms' management. corresponds to an increase in the annual revenue growth by 1.9%.
[Insert Table III here] Column (5) of Table III presents the interaction of firm size and PTC. Table IV ). The coefficients for all revenue deciles are positive and statistically significant at 1% level.
[Insert Table IV here]
IV.D Robustness Test. Corruption and Bank Receipts Growth.
It is possible that firms operating in a corrupt environment underreport their true revenue.
Therefore, as a robustness check of the results, I estimate equation (3) Revenue decile Coeff. for Revenue decile*PTC Top 5 objective measure derived from the banking transaction data. I report the results in Table V. As   the table data show, the results do not change: PTC of firms' management is positively related to bank receipts growth, however this effect decreases with firms' size.
[Insert Table V 
IV.E Robustness Test. Is It Corruption or Something Else?
The results presented in section IV.B indicate that there is a negative relation between the developed corruption measures and firms' growth. However, the obtained results might be caused by some other unobservable personal characteristics related to number of traffic violations, not necessarily propensity to corrupt. For example more cautious drivers have less number of traffic violations and ceteris paribus have higher PTC measure according to developed metric. To test this hypothesis, I use formulas (5) and (6) to build a similar to PTC measure but using the number of traffic violations and traffic accidents as determinant variables.
Then, I estimate equations (7) and (8) using the obtained measures. Table VI presents the estimation results. As we can see from columns (1) and (2), the coefficient for Violations measure is negative and statistically significant. This result is similar to the one reported in Table III : there is a negative relation between number of reported traffic violations and revenue growth. 9 In contrast, columns (3) and (4) indicate a positive relation between Accidents and firms' growth statistically significant in one out of two cases. As discussed before, the main difference between statistics on traffic accidents and statistics on traffic violations is that almost all traffic accidents are recorded. Thus the number of traffic accidents is an objective measure of driving safeness. One possible explanation of a positive relation between number of traffic accidents and firms' growth is risk taking. Risk takers might be more successful entrepreneurs and have higher probability to participate in traffic accidents. Cain and McKeon (2012) investigate the CEOs who possess small aircraft pilot licenses (fatality data indicate that piloting small aircraft is a risky activity). They find evidence that these CEOs choose higher leverage and have greater stock return volatility. Another possible explanation is that highly corrupt entrepreneurs drive with less caution knowing that they can avoid punishment in exchange for a bribe. 10 Thus the number of traffic accidents and propensity to corrupt are positively correlated.
This possible positive correlation between PTC and number of traffic accidents yields to a positive relation between revenue growth and number of traffic accidents.
9 PTC and number of reported violation are inversely related 10 I would like to thank Andrei Shleifer for suggesting this explanation [Insert Table VI Table AII ). An average (median) company has assets of $2,977K ($136K), revenue of $3,210K ($443K), and 92 (29) employees. Another robustness check is to estimate PTC for different samples of drivers (see Table I for the reference). I build PTC(2) for drivers only from the city of Moscow. PTC (3) is constructed for the subsample of driver for which distance to work is determined. PTC (4) 
IV.G Corruption of Regulatory Environment and Firm Performance
Applying formula (9) I calculate PTC of different government agencies. These findings lead to the conclusion that corruption of government agencies are negatively related to firms' performance.
[Insert Table VIII here]
IV.H Interpretation of Results
A natural explanation of the obtained results is that in a corrupt economy, like Russia, corrupt managers outperform non-corrupt ones. However, an alternative explanation is that creative people with high moral standards prefer not to become entrepreneurs in the first place.
Both explanations lead to a negative effect on economic development. In the first case, less efficient firms with corrupt management benefit on expense of more efficient ones but with less corrupt management. Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2012) show that in more corrupt localities public procurement contracts are allocated to less efficient firms. In the second case, the adverse effect of corruption is probably more severe. Creative people with high moral standards might either prefer to be employed in other sectors of economy, or even move to another country.
The relation between corruption of government agencies and firm performance might be affected by endogeneity issues. Allocation of employees among agencies is not random. It is likely that more corrupt government employees would prefer to be appointed to the districts with better economic prospects; thus they can extract more rents from faster growing firms. This possible endogeneity problem should bias estimation coefficients upwards. Therefore, it is possible that the true negative effect of the corruption of regulatory environment on firm performance might be even bigger than reported.
Conclusion
This paper develops a novel approach to measuring corruption at the individual level. Using a unique dataset of Moscow traffic violations, I infer propensity to corrupt for 3.1 million
Based on individual PTC, I build a measure of PTC for management of 58,157 privately held firms. I show that firms with corrupt management significantly outperform the ones with not-corrupt management. A one standard deviation increase in PTC of companies' management is associated to an increase in the annual revenue growth rate by 1.9%.
Next, I build PTC measures for government agencies assuming that propensity to offer a bribe is positively correlated with propensity to ask for a bribe. I show that PTC of the government agencies is negatively related to firm performance. A one standard deviation increase in PTC of tax agency corresponds to a decrease in the firms' annual revenue growth rate by 0.65%. Whereas a one standard deviation increase in PTC of fire department is related to a decline in the firms' annual revenue growth rate by 0.73%. Gender is a dummy which equates to 1 for men and 0 for women. Driver's age is calculated as the average driver's age. Driving experience is the average driving experience. Income is the average person's income taken from the personal income data of Moscow residents. Distance to work is calculated as a straight line between person's home zip code and his or her employer zip code averaged over the sample period. Distance to work is obtained for 2,235,680 observations. Driver owns a car is a dummy which equates to 1 if a person ever owned a car during the sample period (car registry is available only for the city of Moscow). Car age and Car power are the average car age and car horse power calculated during the period person's owned a car or cars. Column (1) contains the entire sample of drivers. Column (2) includes only drivers from the city of Moscow. Column (3) presents the subsample of driver for which distance to work is determined. Column (4) contains only drivers from Moscow which own a car. Column (5) includes only drivers with a positive record of tra¢ c accidents. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. PTC (2) PTC (3) PTC (4) PTC (5) (1) 
